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The Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation 
concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the 
Arctic Ocean, which Russia and Norway signed on September 15, 2010, is 
regarded by the officialdom as a great diplomatic success. It is believed that the 
sides removed all the obstacles to the exploration of hydrocarbon wealth of the 
Arctic oceanic shelf as they attained a compromise solution. However, the treaty 
disregards a whole range of vital legal aspects, which may be detrimental to the 
operation of Russian state companies in the region, including possible weighty 
losses due to discrepancies in tax treatment.  
The Russian-Norwegian treaty came as the most recent international 
legislative step on the part of Moscow in the long chain of moves to cede the 
geographic spaces – or claims to them – to which Russia had priority rights 
compared with its neighbors (as is widely known, these are the U.S. and Norway).  
The total area of the land surface ceded by Russia in North America – 
mostly to the U.S. – has been estimated in Sergei Pykhtin’s article “How Russian 
America Was Sold” (Russ. Ed). According to his data, Russia lost a total 3.2 
million square kilometers without getting a single dollar for it. In the utmost North 
of Europe, Russia transferred to Norway the so-called “common region” between 
the Kola Peninsula and the Scandinavian Peninsula and Spitsbergen (Svalbard), 
with the total area standing at 65,000 sq. km. This does not take account of 
Finnmark, which Muscovy (Moscow principality to Russian Tsardom) loosed 
under the Teusina Peace Treaty of 1595. And no one has measured yet the area of 
the continental shelf adjacent to these land surface spaces, although they run into 
millions of square kilometers.  
Russia’s continental shelf is equal to 6.2 million sq. km, of which 4 million 
sq. km are potentially rich in oil and gas. Foreign geologists from the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf will consider after our 
country’s repeated submission whether another 1.2 million sq. km or part thereof 
will belong to Russia. However, the sphere of Russia’s jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf in the limits of its polar sector could be expanded by about 1.5 
million sq. km even without any submission if it makes the use of the norms of 
international law and national legislation more expediently. (For more detail on the 
history of establishing the borders in the Arctic region, see the article “Arctic 
Diplomacy: History Lessons for Settling Disputes on Litigious Territories” by the 
same author, published in Russia in Global Affairs, No.4, 2009 – Ed.) 
Leading international analysts consider the West Arctic oil and gas shelf 
province, which the Russian-Norwegian delimitation line runs through, as a region 
where the resources may substitute for the falling production of oil in the North 
Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. The crude from the Persian Gulf can be totally 
disregarded in this situation. The discovery of the province was announced at an 
international congress in London in 1983, but only now is Russia getting down to 
its development in practical terms. One of the largest deposits making up the 
province is the Shtokmanovsky; its resources are comparable to those of entire 
Norway. 
Norway and Russia have sovereign rights to the continental shelf spaces of 
the Barents Sea, which include: the Russian shelf, the Norwegian shelf, the shelf 
areas around Svalbard, and the shelf areas of the litigious zone. Following forty 
years of talks, the Russian-Norwegian treaty concerning maritime delimitation in 
the Barents Sea divided the litigious zone into approximately two equal parts. 
According to the Russian data, the zone of litigations has an area of 180,000 
sq. km. Norway estimates it at 175,000 sq. km, including 20,000 sq. km in the 
Arctic Ocean. The Fedynsky High located in the southern part of the Barents Sea is 
believed to contain the most promising resources. Unofficial forecasts suggest its 
reserves exceed the Shtokmanovsky by a factor of three. It was precisely this part 
of the shelf that the Russian-Norwegian talks were deadlocked over. 
The Barents Sea has one more problem that was somehow overlooked in the 
treaty concerning maritime delimitation and hence remains outstanding. It 
concerns the regime of sea and shelf areas adjacent to Svalbard. In this connection 
we must recall the history of the establishment of dividing lines in the Arctic 
Ocean.  
The conventions of 1825 and 1867 between Russia, on the one part, and 
Great Britain and the U.S., on the other, established the lines of demarcation 
between their land possessions in the Arctic Ocean. The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) 
treaty, signed in the course of the Versailles Peace Conference in 1920, provides 
for the recognition of Norway’s sovereignty over the land surface of the 
archipelago subject to the stipulations that this country creates a unified legal 
regime for the nationals of all the signatory countries on the shore and in the 
adjoining sea areas likewise. They can carry on different types of economic 
activities there subject to the observance of local laws and regulations.  
The full legislative base of the Norwegian “shelf” legislation is given in the 
submission of this country to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf and represents the petroleum legislation of Norway. The first piece of 
legislation referred to in it, is a Royal Resolution of 1963; it sets the Norwegian 
jurisdiction over all seabed and its subsoil, which is subject to the sovereign rights 
of Oslo, and suggests that Svalbard has not its own shelf and the adjacent seabed 
and its subsoil is a natural extension of the underwater part of mainland Norway.  
This approach can be explained by the fact that Svalbard had no territorial 
waters borders at the time while the baselines and the territorial sea limits are used 
to define the limits of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ). Norway set the limits of “the territorial sea” around the archipelago as late 
as in 1970, without providing the reasons for why it applied the term “territorial 
sea” in this case. The Svalbard Treaty contains the term “territorial waters”. In the 
meantime, under the effective international law foreign citizens have differing 
amounts of rights in the territorial waters of Svalbard and in the territorial sea 
adjacent to littoral states.  
Highly reputed Russian experts on international law Alexander Vylegzhanin 
and Vyacheslav Zilanov in their book “Spitsbergen: legal regime of adjacent 
marine areas” (Russ. Ed) offered scientific grounding for the Soviet Union’s 
position as specified in the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s note of June 14, 1988. The 
position suggests that the treaty is limited from spatial point of view by the so-









The authors draw a well-substantiated conclusion that Norwegian lawmakers 
do not have the legislative grounds for invoking “territorial sea” as a classical 
institution of contemporary international treaty sea law for marking off the 
exclusive economic zone around the archipelago or on its shelf, since the norms of 
this law does not envision such a possibility. And given the absence of any other 
benchmarks for setting the relevant limits under the customary international law 
and treaty maritime law, the role of such benchmarks can be attributed to the 
geographic coordinates specified in Article 1 of the 1920 Paris Treaty and known 
as the Svalbard Square.  
The regime for the sea spaces adjacent to Svalbard spelt out under Article 3 
of the 1920 Paris Treaty embraces waters, fjords and territorial waters of the 
archipelago and – for the most part – falls in line with the set of notions underlying 
the contemporary international maritime treaty law in what concerns the exclusive 
economic zones. The EEZ concept was drafted in the format of the UN Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and included in the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 1982. It defined the EEZ as an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial 
sea. It is composed of the waters superjacent to the seabed, the seabed itself and its 
subsoil.  
The Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 defines the composition of 
maritime spaces in legal and geographic terms, such as the territorial sea, the 
exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf and waters, seabed and its subsoil. 
According to Article 3 of the Svalbard Treaty, foreign nationals have the right to 
carry on all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of 
absolute equality with Norwegian nationals in the waters adjacent to Svalbard. On 
its part, Norway is expected to maintain the local regime in these spaces based on 
the norms of the Svalbard Treaty.  
However, the Norwegians claim that the Paris Treaty of 1920 does not apply 
beyond the limits of the Svalbard territorial sea. At the same time, they needed the 
limits of the “territorial sea” for establishing the limits of the Svalbard shelf areas 
and the economic zone (fishery protection zone). The Norwegians draw the limits 
of the zone which includes waters adjacent to the archipelago and the seabed lying 
under them in 1977. In doing so, however, they disregarded the provisions of the 
Svalbard Treaty stipulating that the same regime applies to this zone, too. 
Norway’s move aroused sharp protests from a number of signatory countries. 
Meanwhile, the presence of the fishery (economic) zone made it possible for 
Norway not to establish an exclusive economic zone around Svalbard.  
Norway has a law on economic zone, but there is no law on the continental 
shelf. Instead introduced Oslo in 1985 a petroleum law, and released its new 
edition in 1996. According to this document was established a unified petroleum 
regime in all the spaces under the jurisdiction of Norway (mainly in respect to the 
seabed and the subsoil thereof), including the land territory of mainland Norway, 
but excluding Svalbard, its internal waters and “territorial sea”.  
In this regard, both within the “Norwegian shelf spaces” measured from the 
baselines of the archipelago and the limits of its “territorial sea” and the onshore 
continental Norway applies the same rules. That is, the basis of the regime of 
“shelf spaces” of Svalbard is Norwegian sovereignty over the continental part of 
this country, and this is a direct violation of paragraph 1 of Article 77 of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, according to which: “The coastal State 
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights ...”. Other countries-
participants of the treaty on Svalbard do not share the position of Norway to the 
regime, in the language of the treaty, of waters surrounding this archipelago.  
The difference in the approaches of Norway and other signatories to the 
Paris Treaty to the issue of the Svalbard continental shelf and the regime applicable 
to it arises from the fact that the maritime areas adjacent to it may have taxation 
levels as low as those existing on the archipelago. As for mainland Norway, the 
taxes come to 78 percent of the revenues that businesses get from the shelf 
deposits. Yet the 1920 Paris Treaty says that the export duty “shall not exceed 1 % 
of the maximum value of the minerals exported up to 100.000 tons, and beyond 
that quantity the duty will be proportionately diminished”. Unofficial forecasts by 
Russian geologists suggest that the shelf deposits in question may contain up to 1 
percent of the global reserves of hydrocarbons.  
Thus, Norway altered the spatial terms of the Svalbard Treaty in a unilateral 
manner by applying the norms of national legislation that was drafted counter to or 
without account of provisions of this treaty. In addition, it took some foreign 
policy steps to prop up its position. In 2006, Norway signed an agreement with 
Denmark on the delimitation of sea areas between Svalbard and Greenland, which 
ignores the Svalbard Treaty provisions regarding the spaces where it has legal 
effect. In 2009 geology experts of the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf handed to the Norwegians a recommendation on how to establish 
limits of the continental shelf measured from the archipelago. Yet geologists do not 
have the power to advise on the imposition of shelf limits in the areas which have a 
special international legal position defined by the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 – not by 
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
As for Russia, the clue to the problem is found in the line connecting points 
2 to 8, which are indicated in Clause 1 of Article 1 of the Russian-Norwegian 
treaty on delimitation and which stand out of “the Svalbard Square”. The reference 
to these points shows that Russia – and also Denmark –followed the Norwegian 
stand. The latter, as we said above, is based on violation of the Svalbard treaty 
provisions and on establishing a legal position for areas adjacent to Svalbard that 
has no parallels in international law.  
However, if one proceeds from the principle of pacta sunt servanda – 
“treaties must be respected” – the spaces specified in Article 1 of the Svalbard 
Treaty and the regime for the spaces adjacent to the archipelago may not be 
changed by the Norwegians either unilaterally or through bilateral agreements with 
neighboring countries, or using recommendations by the UN Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf. These actions, agreements or decisions on the 
spaces adjacent to the archipelago can be taken by any contracting party of the 
Svalbard Treaty to The Hague International Court of Justice.  
The absence of provisions in the Russian-Norwegian delimitation treaty for 
the legal realities of the Svalbard treaty and Norway’s national legislation will 
slash the revenues of Russian state oil and gas companies (Rosneft, Gazprom, 
Zarubezhneft) which have a legally confirmed access to the continental shelf, 
should oil and gas deposits be found at the interface of the Russian shelf in the 
Barents Sea and “the shelf spaces” around Svalbard.  
As specified by the 1920 Paris Treaty, the Russian companies should enjoy 
the same right of access to such deposits as the Norwegian companies. They are 
also expected to pay the taxes for Svalbard’s needs in the amount of less than 1 
percent of the cost of hydrocarbons produced. The text of the Russian-Norwegian 
treaty does not suggest, for instance, that if the delimitation line runs across a 
deposit discovered by Russian companies in the Russian sector of the Barents Sea 
and extends into the zone covered by the Svalbard Treaty, these companies will 
have the right to operate on the basis of local legislation there, paying part of taxes 
to the Russian government and another – much smaller – part for Svalbard’s needs. 
Annex II to the Russian-Norwegian delimitation treaty mentions only the 
norms of the two countries’ national legislations. The essence of Norwegian 
legislation effective beyond the territorial sea of the archipelago has been discussed 
above. Since these realities are not featured in the bilateral delimitation treaty, the 
Russian oil and gas producers will have to share an appropriate part of each such 
deposit located in the Svalbard Square with the Norwegians under provisions of 
the treaty, to say nothing of the transfer of part of the incontestably Russian 
continental shelf to Norway. 
If a deposit beginning within the limits of the archipelago’s territory extends 
beyond its territorial waters, the Russian companies working on Svalbard will be 
expected (in violation of the Svalbard Treaty) to observe the norms of Norway’s 
continental mainland petroleum legislation in the sea areas adjacent to the 
archipelago. This means that 78 percent of their earnings from the hydrocarbons 
produced outside Norway’s territorial waters will go away in tax payments to the 
Norwegian treasury.  
Article 6 of the Russian-Norwegian delimitation treaty contains the 
following provision: “The present Treaty shall not prejudice rights and obligations 
under other international treaties to which both the Kingdom of Norway and the 
Russian Federation are Parties, and which are in force at the date of the entry into 
force of the present Treaty”. Yet this provision does ensure the protection of the 
Russian oil and gas producers’ interests, since the Soviet Union did not react to the 
Norwegian petroleum law back in 1985. For this reason, the emergence of a 
litigious issue and/or its submission to the International Court will automatically 
bring into effect the estoppel princple rather than the provision of the bilateral 
treaty cited above. This principle suggests that a signatory party’s (to the 
Spitsbergen treaty) silent consent to a certain state of things leads to the loss of the 
right to refer in the future to grounds proving the treaty’s invalidity. The same 
concerns Article 3 of the Danish-Norwegian agreement on the delimitation of the 
sea spaces between Greenland and Svalbard.  
Soviet-American and Russian-Norwegian agreements regarding the Arctic 
Ocean envision delimitation of maritime spaces, while similar Canadian, Danish 
and Norwegian agreements on maritime Arctic speak of the delimitation of areas in 
accord with concrete legal notions. The Soviet-American agreement of 1990 
suggests that it deals with the delimitation of jurisdictions concerning exclusive 
economic zones, as well as waters, the seabed and the subsoil. One of the 
objectives the Soviet side pursued by signing this agreement was to influence the 
course of talks with Norway on the delimitation of maritime areas. The results of 
that attempt are well-known now. 
As Alexander Vylegzhanin writes in his article “Twenty Years of 
Provisional Application of the Soviet-American Agreement on the Line of 
Delimitation of Maritime Spaces,” application of the median line principle could 
have provided the Soviet Union with an additional area of 25,000 sq. km in the 
Bering Sea compared to what it had by applying the line established in 1867. 
According to the 1867 Convention, part of that line might have run through the 
Arctic Ocean as far as the North Pole. In the meantime, the message of President 
George H.W. Bush made to the U.S. Congress on the occasion of the ratification of 
the above-mentioned Soviet-American agreement and the map supplementing 
Russia’s submission to the UN Continental Shelf Commission indicate that the 
delimitation is restricted by the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Russia might 
also benefit if the median line principle were applied to the delimitation of the 
Arctic continental shelf between Russia and the U.S.  
Of all the terms specified in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
to define maritime areas, the recently signed Russian-Norwegian maritime 
delimitation treaty mentions the Russian EEZ and the two countries’ continental 
shelf. Since the Norwegian legislative base defining the regime of the country’s 
“continental shelf” and the limits of Svalbard’s “shelf areas” is not free from 
imperfections, this treaty should have taken into account the specific features of the 
spatial provisions of the Svalbard Treaty. Also, it makes sense to use the entire 
scope of legal notions that the contemporary international law of the sea applies 
nowadays in considering delimitation issues.  
The special international legal position of the Svalbard Square, which de 
facto is a historical enclave, does not allow Norway to make claims for extending 
the “Norwegian continental shelf” as far as the North Pole on the basis of 
agreements with neighboring countries using Article 83 of the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, which covers the issues of delimitation of continental shelf 
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. This, in turn, presupposes a 
possible delimitation of deep-lying shelf spaces of the Arctic Ocean between 
Russia and Denmark (or self-governed Greenland) on the basis of the very same 
Article 83 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
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